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This article examines the rise of vigilantism in southeastern Nigeria. Two opposing discourses 
on Nigerian vigilantism are examined. The first is characterized by the valorization of vigilantes 
as heroes in popular Nigerian video movies. The second is represented by a recent Human Rights 
Watch (HRW) report denouncing the vigilantes as criminals. My research utilizes ethnographic 
research to contextualize the video movies as a means toward understanding the ideological gap 
between these discourses. A close analysis of the Issakaba video series reveals a subtle treatment 
of the vigilante phenomenon designed to appeal to an indigenous perspective that is cognizant of 
the inherent risks of vigilante justice but also aware of the limitations of reform strategies such as 
those proposed by the HRW report.  
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Juju and Justice at the Movies: Vigilantes in Nigerian Popular Videos 
 
I was traveling across southern Nigeria from Enugu to Lagos in what Nigerians call a “luxury 
bus.” Packed with people, the large coach alternated between rocketing down stretches of 
expressway that were relatively pothole free, and crawling slowly over the long tracks of road 
that were more pothole than pavement. It would be a full day of travel and as usual, a salesman 
provided entertainment for part of the journey. Before peddling his wares, he led the passengers 
in a few hymns and then gave a sermon in which he petitioned Jesus to protect the bus from 
violent attack. Utterances from the passengers enthusiastically endorsed this sentiment. Luxury 
buses had become a favorite target for the armed-robbers that plague Nigeria’s roads and 
markets. Just a few weeks earlier, robbers on this very route had forced a bus like this to a stop, 
and thirty passengers were murdered.  
Thus, bus sermons provide a modicum of comfort to Nigerians who seek security in an 
increasingly perilous environment. Understanding this helps one to appreciate the poignancy of 
the opening scene of Issakaba 2, the second in an extremely popular Nigerian video movie series 
about armed robbers and the vigilantes or “Bakassi Boys” that have mobilized to stop them. The 
movie opens with an inspiring sermon on a luxury bus. The preacher, shouts, “I pray that none of 
you meet any robber today, in Jesus’ name!” and the passengers respond with a resounding 
“Amen!” He then smiles ironically and says, “Brethren, I don’t know how effective that prayer 
was… Because, you are face to face with an armed robber!” Suddenly brandishing a gun, he 
walks down the aisle demanding money and jewelry from the passengers. Along the way he 
grabs a baby from its mother and points his gun at its head as the mother begs pitifully for mercy. 
This dramatic transition from religious comfort to abject terror in the opening scene of the movie 
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resonates with the anxiety Nigerians feel about the pervasive violence that has become an 
increasingly prevalent fact in their lives. 
On our bus, however, the preacher was of the ordinary sort. He was soon hawking his odd 
assortment of products including Indian ayurvedic ointments and packaged wafers. By the time 
we reached Onitsha his performance was over. It was Sunday morning and the streets of the 
great market city on the Niger River were bustling with people on their way to church services. 
Through the windshield I caught a fleeting glimpse of what looked like a headless body on the 
median. Then I saw another decapitated human body between the roads. Smoke rose lazily from 
it, much of the flesh burned away from the blackened bones. I watched the crowds of finely 
dressed churchgoers milling past the carnage. They seemed to take no more notice of the 
mutilated corpses at their feet than they did of the clutter of refuse that had accumulated between 
the roads. People stepped around the bodies and went on their way.  
I knew the Bakassi Boys had been summoned by Governor Mbadinuju of Anambra State to rid 
the city of Onitsha of a plague of armed robbers. I knew that the Governor had acted under 
pressure from citizens of Onitsha, particularly the market women who had suffered extensive 
loss of property and life from the thieves’ predations. I knew the methods of justice and 
techniques of execution employed by this now legendary vigilante group. I knew, therefore, what 
it was I was witnessing. I wondered whether the people who strode past the corpses perceived 
them as marking the end of a reign of terror—irrefutable evidence that the murderous criminals 
whose dismembered bodies smoldered by the road would no longer threaten them. My struggle 
to understand the scene intellectually, however, left me unsatisfied. The city’s resident’s reaction 
to the carnage remained opaque.  
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What is the popular logic of vigilantism in Southeastern Nigeria? In this essay I want to explore 
this question while resisting the tendency to reduce it to a “world-view” or “culture” 
incommensurable with my own. I want, instead, to ground my analysis in: 1) the ethnographic 
and historical complexities of the experience of violence and justice in Nigeria, 2) an 
examination of the social conditions that frame the present wave of vigilantism, and, most 
crucially, 3) the mythography of the Bakassi Boys in Nigeria's popular video movies. I contend 
that these movies provide unique insights into everyday Nigerian experience that help make the 
popular logic of vigilantism and public reactions to it more readily intelligible. 
While wary of analytic strategies that posit coherent but incommensurable cultural worlds, I also 
remain wary of strategies that assume conditions of social incoherence. In examining the crisis of 
civil law in Nigeria, I want to avoid resorting to the concept of chaos that has become a common 
formula for describing conditions in postcolonial states. In this I heartily agree with Achille 
Mbembe's (2001: 8-9) critique in which he contends that little is accomplished by resorting to the 
notion of chaos to dismiss rather than interpret the complex fluctuations, meanderings, 
juxtapositions, displacements, and entanglements of factors that characterize postcolonial 
African nations. Mbembe argues that employing chaos as a pseudo-explanatory strategy is a lazy 
intellectual gesture that falls back on a pernicious habit of analyzing conditions in Africa by way 
of notions of lack, absence, incompleteness, and darkness. 
My underlying assumption is that all societies value human life and social justice, that every 
society is faced with individuals who transgress those values, and that the prevalence of those 
transgressions increase when systems of social control are corrupt and ineffective. Events of day-
to-day life, however violent, are made intelligible and are imbued with meaning on the basis of 
lived experience. Reactions to public violence in different societies vary not because of innate 
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differences of culture or value systems that are incommensurable, but due to historically 
constituted conditions that structure variant and sometimes radically divergent expressions of 
common human needs and values.  
 
Valor or Villainy? The Rise of The Bakassi Boys in Nigeria 
In May 2002 Human Rights Watch (HRW), in conjunction with a Nigerian NGO called Centre 
for Law Enforcement Education-Nigeria (CLEEN), issued a report entitled The Bakassi Boys: 
The Legitimization of Murder and Torture. The report condemned the extrajudicial crime-
fighting activities of the Bakassi Boys who have been conducting vigilante operations in the Igbo 
speaking region of Nigeria since the late-1990s. HRW argued that while vigilante action may 
have been initiated as a desperate effort by citizens to protect themselves from the rampant crime 
in the region, the vigilantes have now become a terror themselves, committing a range of 
atrocities including torture and execution without trial. The report chronicled the vigilante 
excesses and challenged the Nigerian government to prosecute the Bakassi Boys for their crimes 
and bring all law enforcement activities under control of the established federal criminal justice 
system. 
Responses to HRW’s report came quickly from Nigerian pundits and intellectuals. Many of 
them, while agreeing for the most part with the facts cited, differed rather markedly regarding the 
report's evaluation of the Bakassi Boy phenomenon. Many also took exception to HRW's 
proposal that legal action against vigilantes and enhanced training for Nigerian police constituted 
an appropriate or adequate response to Nigeria's intractable law enforcement crisis. In an essay 
published on AfricaResouce.com, Peter Ekeh (2002) began his critique by acknowledging what 
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he called the “courageous reports” issued by Human Rights Watch regarding the destructive 
activities of oil companies in the Niger Delta and other human rights abuses in Nigeria. He went 
on, however, to criticize HRW’s condemnation of the Bakassi Boys, beginning with what he 
called the report’s “anthropological speculation”—referring to HRW's argument that the Bakassi 
Boys represent a resurgence of precolonial structures and practices. He suggested that the 
explanation for the rise of vigilantism in Nigeria is “far less complicated.” 
Ekeh redirects attention to the deplorable conditions that, in his opinion, have made vigilante 
justice a necessary evil. Most crucially, he cites the complete failure of government to protect the 
civilian populace from criminals. He argues that the government has been degraded by decades 
of kleptocratic rule and is beholden to multinational petroleum companies to such an extent that 
it is no longer a government at all in the conventional sense. Ekeh reasons that the fundamental 
structure of Nigerian government is so utterly corrupt and unaccountable to its citizenry that it 
cannot fulfill the most basic peacekeeping functions. Under such conditions, argues Ekeh, the 
rise of vigilantism is not only likely but also perhaps inevitable.  
In an essay entitled “The Truth about the Bakassi Boys,” U. S. based Nigerian author Obi 
Akwani (2002) provides another critique of the HRW report. Akwani begins by acknowledging 
that his own initial reaction to news of vigilantism in Nigeria was similar to the concerns 
expressed in the report. He assumed that the Bakassi Boys were an Igbo political militia driven 
by regional and ethnic nationalist impulses parallel to the O’odua Peoples Congress (OPC) of the 
Yoruba or the Arewa Peoples Congress (APC) of the Hausa-Fulani. It was only upon his return 
to Nigeria that he recognized the striking distinction between the crime fighting Bakassi Boys 
and the other explicitly political organizations. This was a difference he felt was poorly 
understood by Human Rights Watch.  
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Akwani’s observations are particularly germane to this analysis because he credits his insights 
regarding the Bakassi Boys to his viewing of several popular Nigerian movies that, in his words 
“depict… them as heroes.” The Nigerian video movie industry has arisen in the past decade as a 
grass-roots phenomenon.i It is an “outsider” movie industry that operates without funding from 
government or interests abroad. This “folk cinema” is quite distinct from the art films and 
documentaries that have traditionally been the focus of African cinema studies. The videos 
circulate in open markets and have quickly established a diverse audience across the continent. It 
is a highly prolific industry producing thousands of titles a year. Genres include comedies, 
romances, religious melodramas, and action films. Among these, movies on the topic of 
vigilantism are among the most popular. Vigilante themed titles are so abundant that they can be 
said to represent a sub-genre in themselves. The list includes the Ashes-to-Ashes series, the 
mediocre Baka Boys, and the inept comedy Bakassi Girls. The most popular by far, however, is 
the Issakabaii series, of which, the fourth episode was recently released and, as they say in 
Nigeria, “sold like pure water.” Virtually all of these popular movies present the Bakassi Boys as 
mythic heroes, superheroes in fact, endowed with extraordinary abilities due to the powerful 
jujus they possess. The charms make them invulnerable to machetes and bullets and allow them 
to precisely identify the guilty.  
The Nigeria depicted in the movies is one characterized by a pervasive failure of leadership. The 
argument that the cause of Nigeria’s many problems can be traced to a failure of leadership was 
canonized by Achebe’s (1984) well-known essay: The Trouble with Nigeria. Among Igbo people 
this view is virtually proverbial and it pervades the dramatic logic of the vigilante movies. In the 
world of Issakaba, village chiefs, elected officials, religious leaders, police, and venerable native 
doctors all conspire in greed driven murderous exploits while decent members of the community 
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live in perpetual terror. When, at last, the vigilantes arrive, they are depicted as the very 
embodiment of a return to justice. The drama revolves around the vigilantes' employment of 
occult techniques to unravel the complex web of deception, avarice, and the abuse of public trust 
that has undermined the possibility of conventional institutionalized justice.  
 
The Elusive Character of Justice  
The disjuncture between the depiction of Bakassi Boys as valiant superheroes in Nigerian 
movies and HRW’s accounts of them as perpetrators of atrocity is significant. Both the movies 
and the report engage in discourses that seek a moral clarity—a formula for action that can make 
justice possible under conditions where both agree that justice is sorely needed. The movies draw 
the viewer into the Nigerian experience of violence and the despair that results in a way that 
vividly evokes what Mbembe (2001: 8) calls the "labyrinthine entanglements" of crime, 
leadership, and justice in postcolonial Africa. In doing so, the movies concretize a narrative that 
makes the Bakassi Boys intelligible— a position from which one can agree with HRW's report in 
principle, but nevertheless empathize with the day-to-day desperation and loss of faith in 
government that informs Nigerians’ attraction to the mythography of vigilante justice in the 
movies. 
If, however, the movies simply valorized Bakassi Boys without exploring the inherent fallibility 
of vigilantism—indeed, the inevitability of its corruption— then they would have failed not only 
as ideology but also as drama. In truth, many of the weaker examples of the genre have this 
failing. I contend, however, that the popularity of the Issakaba series is due precisely to the fact 
that a pervasive subtext regarding the perilous character of vigilantism and indeed, the elusive 
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nature of justice itself is enfolded in the dramatic structure. The movies are crafted to remind us 
that while the Bakassi Boys are “depicted as heroes” they are also susceptible to the human 
weaknesses that have corrupted the leadership in the communities they seek to rescue. In 
Issakaba, this subtext warns the audience that those who fight corruption will eventually be 
contaminated by it. 
To understand the popularity of the Issakaba video series one must go beyond the obvious 
explanation that the movies glorify Bakassi Boys as saviors who finally bring an end to the daily 
violence and terror with which Nigerians are all too familiar. Virtually all the vigilante themed 
movies valorize vigilantism, but the Issakaba movies do so in a highly nuanced manner. I 
contend that Nigerians are attracted to Issakaba because it gestures toward complex truths that 
mediate between a simplistic valorization of vigilantes on-one-hand and their criminalization in 
global forums like the HRW report on the other. One distinguishing feature is the charismatic 
performance of Sam Dede as Ebube—the leader of Issakaba. Dede's embodiment of cool 
philosophical detachment in the face of danger and violence aligns him with classic action heroes 
from Clint Eastwood's lone gunman to Richard Roundtree's unflappable Shaft. Like them, his 
reflections on the nature of his violent occupation also reveal a sense of its moral ambivalence. 
But Dede's character is also both a distinctly African and distinctly modern hero who speaks in 
proverbs and who longs to return to his former occupation as a fashion designer. In each of the 
four Issakaba movies Dede’s character is confronted with a powerful native doctor whose juju he 
cannot, at first, defeat and his cool detachment gives way to a very human despair and fits of 
frustrated rage.  
In Issakaba, Ebube offers a thinly fictionalized version of the seminal events that precipitated the 
emergence of the Bakassi Boys in southeast Nigeria in the late 1990s. The cinematic account is 
Juju and Justice at the Movies   10 
quite consistent with Harnischfeger’s (2003) research as well as Bakassi Boy origin narratives I 
encountered in my own ethnographic research. The Bakassi Boys originated in the sprawling 
Ariaria Market in Aba. According to Harnischfeger (2003: 23) the pivotal events occurred in the 
shoe manufacturers section known as Bakassi. The name “Bakassi” was a reference to the 
Bakassi Peninsula that had been the object of an ongoing dispute between Nigeria and 
Cameroon. The shoemakers’ market gained this nickname because of a bitter battle over 
jurisdiction of the area between two local governments and the Market itself. In 1998 the 
marketers were plagued by well-organized armed robbers who had taken up permanent residence 
along Ngwa Road on the outskirts of the market. The thieves regularly extorted protection tribute 
from merchants and confiscated the goods of the noncompliant. These thugs were able to steal 
and kill with impunity as the police ignored and even profited from their activities. The break 
point came when a popular tradeswoman was brutally murdered for 200,000 Naira 
(approximately $1500.00). An immediate uprising of hundreds of traders descended on the 
robbers’ settlement. The enraged marketers dragged the men who had been terrorizing them into 
the streets and hacked them to death with machetes (Ibid). The Bakassi Boys’ vigilante 
organization was formalized in the wake of these events.  
The Bakassi Boys originated in acts of necessity undertaken in the face of terror. Noble 
intentions, however, have a tenuous existence in the midst of the endemic corruption, political 
factionalism, and electoral machinations that characterize the Nigerian political landscape. Thus, 
Nigerians remain suspicious of the power ceded to vigilantes. They recognize that the 
“goodness” of any action is never absolute regardless of the evident “evil” of its target. If history 
has proven anything to Nigerians it is that power, no matter who wields it, will eventually 
corrupt. Thus, when Dede's character warns: “the danger in hunting down evil, is that you 
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gradually become that which you seek to destroy” the sentiment resonates with Nigerians. In a 
country where military coup has been a more prevalent mode of regime change than popular 
election, Nigerians know that replacing one band of armed thugs with another offers little hope 
for a true political reform. 
Nigerian video movies often tend to be slow moving and many are driven by soap opera like 
dialog linked by tedious transportation shots that dwell on expensive automobiles wending their 
way through traffic to the next scene. Therefore, the opening sequence of Issakaba in which the 
vigilantes arrive and publicly decapitate an undercover gun dealer before the title credits even 
begin, is an unambiguous assertion of a more aggressive approach to storytelling. This initial 
scene ends with Dede's character announcing, “Justice has come to town.” If the movie's 
message can be distilled, it is that “justice” is always mixed blessing. When the elders in the 
village first implore Ebube to rid the village of criminals, he offers a proverbial warning: “A 
river does not flow through a forest without breaking down trees. You have asked for cleansing. 
That cleansing will affect every one of you.” Needless to say, this wisdom proves to be prophetic 
and by the time the drama has concluded many prominent citizens are exposed as criminal 
ringleaders and the social order of the community is devastated. 
 
Juju and Justice 
As discussed earlier, Ekeh (2002) dismissed as “anthropological speculation” the HRW report’s 
contention that the Bakassi Boys were resuscitating precolonial legal practices. Ekeh did not, 
however, refute the claim. He only directed attention to the failure of government law-
enforcement (a system Nigerians still refer to as “European”) and away from the profoundly 
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indigenous character of the vigilante response to that failure. The mythography of the movies 
goes much further than HRW to develop this particular trajectory of “speculation.” The 
employment of various charms and occult abilities by both criminals and vigilantes is a central 
dramatic motif of these vigilante dramas. The charms employed are of two main types, defensive 
charms such as those that prevent harm from bullet or machete, and revelatory charms that are 
used to extract confessions. Charms that protect the owner from injury are well documented in 
the colonial literature and belief in the efficacy of such charms remains widespread (Basden 
1921: 203; Talbot 1923: 233-34, 1932: 331).iii Many Nigerians with whom I discussed the 
matter, including university trained scientists, insisted that no one could take on the armed 
robbers without adequate counter-charms of power greater than the protective charms of the 
criminals.  
More significant to our inquiry, however, are the revelatory charms depicted in the movies. 
Unlike the protective charms that are employed by robber and vigilante alike, vigilantes use 
revelatory charms to identify those guilty of crimes. One commonly represented method involves 
the use of a charmed machete that glows blood red when held before a guilty individual. In 
Issakaba the most important charm of this type is a cowry-laden necklace that compels the 
wearer to speak the truth. Confessions obtained by torture as reported by HRW are nowhere to 
be found in the movies. Instead, the vigilantes stand by passively while their jujus cause thieves 
to confess and to implicate those with whom they have conspired. Acceptance of the efficacy of 
these truth-seeking jujus is crucial to the claim that vigilantes can administer justice without 
recourse to due process of law. Therefore, the historical provenance of the authority these charms 
are granted seems much more significant than Ekeh’s acknowledges when he dismisses the 
precolonial roots of vigilante justice in Nigeria. 
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Truth seeking jujus have a long and illustrious history in Nigeria and despite colonial campaigns 
to destroy them and missionary efforts to discredit them, they remain important fixtures of 
village life in southeast Nigeria. Known as arünsi or alüsi in Igbo, truth-mediating jujus were at 
one time a central institution for justice in the region.iv One of the most famous Igbo arünsi, Ibin 
Ukpabi, was located in a cave near Aro Chukwu. The British colonials recognized the jural 
authority vested in the shrine, which they called the “Long Juju,” and in 1900 they mounted an 
expedition into the “hinterlands” to destroy it (Nwabara 1977:100).v While they successfully 
dynamited the cave and subsequently brought the region under colonial control, the priest of the 
arünsi simply relocated it and Ibin Ukpabi and the countless other shrines like it remained 
important mediators of justice in the region. Portable arünsi and poison oracles vested with 
power from a fixed shrine or independently imbued with such power were employed by secret 
societies and other social mediators to divine the truth in legal disputes. Jural guilds, such as the 
Ekpe society that originated in Calabar but exercised legal authority in communities more than a 
hundred miles up the Cross River, consisted primarily of traders allied to protect their goods and 
freedom to travel against the predations of thieves and slave raiders. While colonial courts 
displaced these practices in ordinary criminal cases, they continued to be employed to settle 
disputes, such as witchcraft accusations, that fell outside of the paradigm of colonial law.  
There was no historical break separating precolonial legal procedures from colonial and 
postcolonial practices. Precolonial legal procedures coexisted, and in the case of customary law 
were officially integrated with those imposed by the colonial regime such that an array of legal 
systems including colonial courts, customary law tribunals, elder council deliberations, arünsi 
shrine priests, and diviners offered options that could be played off each other to the advantage 
or disadvantage of litigants. Arünsi remain active in village life to this day. There is no need to 
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speculate a resurgence of precolonial practices to understand why, in the face of an evident 
failure of national law; indigenous legal rationalities come into play. 
 
“Normal Law and Order” 
The HRW report’s (2002: 41) call for the Nigerian government to implement reforms assisting 
the police in “resuming their normal law and order functions across the country as soon as 
possible” presupposes that a police based system of law and order has at some point been a 
“normal” state of affairs in Nigeria. Such an assumption places the report on unstable premises 
from the perspective of most Nigerians. Nigeria has a national police force. States and local 
governments are forbidden from maintaining their own police. The new regime of civilian rule 
has done little to change the perception of police as alien to the regions they monitor. Thus they 
are regarded more like occupying troops than as helpful civil servants. The corrupt character of 
Nigerian police is legendary and the first Issakaba movie includes the local police chief among 
the cadre of officials who conspire with robbers for their own enrichment. In one scene, a woman 
with a blood streaked face runs into the police station announcing that armed robbers have just 
stolen her car. The officers ignore her at first and then lackadaisically shove a pad of paper at her 
and tell her to write her report. When she demands to see the police chief, he interrogates her 
about the valuables in the car. He then explains that he only has two rounds of ammunition for 
his small pistol and that the robbers use automatic weapons. He pleads: “I don’t want to commit 
suicide madam.” When the indignant woman finally leaves, the chief makes it clear that he 
already knows the identity of the thieves. He recounts her inventory of money and jewels to the 
officers and tells them to make sure they are not cheated when collecting their share. 
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The depiction of the police as corrupt is not merely a dramatic strategy in the movies. It reflects 
the attitudes and everyday experience of many Nigerians. The popular daily newspaper 
Vanguard published a story by Harry Nwana (2000) recounting his experiences with the 
Nigerian police. Nwana insisted that collaboration between criminals and police had become the 
normal state of affairs and that people who identified robbers to the police were marked for 
assassination. He wrote: "The situation on the ground is that only criminals and potential 
criminals seek the friendship of the Nigerian police, not honest decent men and women." In spite 
of the fact that Issakaba portrays the police as corrupt, the vigilante leader Ebube is remarkably 
sociological in his explanation of the overall failure of the police. Rather than blame the moral 
shortcomings of individual officers he offers a more structural interpretation: “The police alone 
cannot keep the peace. They are handicapped—poverty, illiteracy, inadequate mobilization. I 
think some persons in high places are benefiting from under-developing the police force.” 
As the series unfolds, the relationship between the vigilantes and the police evolves. In the 
second movie Ebube announces that they will now turn criminals over to the police rather than 
execute them. He explains, “We used to maim and kill them but we have come to realize that no 
matter how wicked some of these people are, no one has the right to take another’s life.” This 
plot development closely follows official statements made by the actual Bakassi Boys regarding 
execution of criminals after criticism of the large-scale massacre of alleged robbers in Onitsha. 
In spite of these declarations of cooperation, however, neither the Bakassi Boys nor the 
cinematic Issakaba were able to keep this pledge.  
The official status of the Bakassi Boys has been unstable and has varied from region to region. In 
both Abia state and Anambra state they have received support from the governors and opposition 
from the police. When the Bakassi Boys cleaned up the market in Aba and subsequently pacified 
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other crime-ridden areas in Abia state, Orji Kalu, the governor, endorsed their crime fighting 
efforts, even as the police protested. The most dramatic official sanction came, however, in 2000 
when the governor of Anambra state asked the Bakassi Boys to employ their uniquely effective 
methods in Onitsha. The city was at a break point. Robbers openly brandished weapons as they 
intimidated marketers and stole goods and money. They terrorized the market on a daily basis. 
As police resolve to neglect the problem became painfully apparent, the thievery escalated into a 
full-blown bloodbath. On one occasion a shooting spree in the market involving a gang of over 
100 thugs “left dozens dead and hundreds injured” (Baker 2002: 225). Shortly after that the 
luxury bus massacre was on the front page of newspapers. It was clear that the violence was out 
of control and that something had to be done. Under pressure from Onitsha market women, 
Governor Chinwoke Mbadinuju invited the Bakassi Boys to Anambra State offering them land 
and vehicles. Almost immediately vans and trucks marked “Anambra Vigilante Services” were 
plying the roads around Onitsha teeming with machete waving Bakassi Boys. This very image is 
returned to again and again in the movies accompanied by the Issakaba theme song. Thus, when 
the movies gained popularity, the valorizing anthem irresistibly sprang to mind whenever one 
saw the vigilante vans passing on the road.  
The burned human remains I witnessed from the window of the bus were the result of the first 
wave of executions staged by the Bakassi Boys after they were brought to Onitsha. My old friend 
Chief Ink explained the reason they chose to leave the corpses exposed and why they destroyed 
them by burning. When they first began operations in Aba, the Bakassi Boys removed the bodies 
of the people they executed. People began, however, to accuse them of selling human body parts 
to ritualists for use in moneymaking ceremonies. The traffic in human body parts is a grisly 
business that most Nigerians will go along way to keep their distance from. The fate of those 
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who do not is a theme explored in many of the popular videos (McCall 2002). Public witness of 
the disposal of criminal remains is, therefore, a technique to demonstrate that the vigilantes have 
“clean hands.” The Bakassi Boys leave the bodies on public display as a gesture of transparency. 
It is a procedure of reverse panopticism born of Igbo participatory democracy and it is 
fundamental to the unique legitimacy that the Bakassi Boys claim. Foucault (1977) argued that 
modern systems of social control are based on panoptical surveillance as opposed to premodern 
practices, such as public torture and execution, which are based on spectacle. The shift from 
premodern to modern techniques of social control involves a reversal of the legitimizing gaze 
from transparent public display to centralized pervasive surveillance. In the context of Nigeria, 
however, “the center cannot hold” as Yeats and Igbo proverb have it.vi The government has 
failed to establish an effective system of social control or civil justice in which the populace can 
have any confidence. Therefore, the raw public transparency of the Bakassi Boys’ form of justice 
is powerful precisely because it promises to turn the public gaze upon the thieves in their midst 
and follow the corruption as far up the structure as it can go. 
 
Folk Justice and Political Reform 
The Issakaba series ends, suitably, on a note of irresolution. Ebube’s second in command, an 
ambitious young man named Nwoke is exposed extorting money from citizens. Nwoke breaks 
from the group and starts his own corrupt vigilante squad. Fully knowledgeable about the source 
of Issakaba’s occult powers, Nwoke proves to be their most formidable opponent. He leads a 
band dressed in the distinctive Issakaba uniforms on a killing spree. The villagers, believing that 
the vigilantes have violated their pledge to “never shed innocent blood,” rise up in protest and 
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the Issakaba are driven from town. In the end, Ebube must fight Nwoke alone. He is victorious 
but his vigilantes have been disbanded and dispersed. Corruption within their membership has 
undermined their cohesion and their reputation. Their claim to represent justice is destabilized by 
the uncertain locus of vigilante authority. This cinematic turn closely follows the actual 
fluctuations of vigilante status in Nigeria. Though the three Issakaba sequels were all produced 
in 2001, they were released in a staggered manner and the fourth movie hit the shelves in late 
2002 shortly after the HRW report was released. As viewers were buying the fourth installment, 
Nigerian Police began to crack down on vigilante activities in Abia State, where the Bakassi 
Boys originated. Newspaper reports on the police raids confirmed many of the accusations made 
in the HRW report including accounts of torture chambers, rape, and arbitrary imprisonment 
(Abuja 2002; Ujumadu 2002). The police crackdown on the Bakassi Boys was, however, limited 
and had mixed results. One commentator observed that: “A police force incapable of checking 
armed robbery can hardly be in a position to stamp out such a well-organised and popular 
community group, more so, when it offers no viable alternative to the services of the vigilantes” 
(Elekwachi 2003). 
The Nigerian constitution prohibits the establishment of state and local police precisely because 
ambitious leaders could employ local militias to oppose federal forces or silence political 
opposition.vii The official endorsement of vigilantism, however, may have provided governors a 
legal loophole to do just that. In late 2002, as Nigeria moved toward elections in 2003, critics of 
the incumbent governors in some of the southeastern states began to fall victim to a horrifying 
wave of brutal assassinations. Police reported they believed that the state sponsored “Anambra 
Vigilante Services” were behind the killings of several opposition leaders including the brutal 
murder of Barnabas Igwe, president of the state bar association and outspoken critic of Anambra 
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governor Mbadinuju. (United Nations 2002). As in the Issakaba movies, a lack of clear 
distinction between authentic Bakassi Boys, political thugs, and renegade imposters further 
obscured the already murky status of vigilantism in Nigeria. As the vigilante actions against 
criminals became increasingly entangled with the suppression of earnest political opposition the 
popular support for vigilantism began to wane (Abuja 2002, Ujumadu 2002). 
The HRW report recommends that the only acceptable solution to Nigeria’s crime problem 
would be a systematic reform of the police and courts by the federal government. I am quite sure 
that the vast majority of Nigerians would welcome such a development. They remain, however, 
highly skeptical that the government they have can produce even a marginally less corrupt 
criminal justice system in the near future. This skepticism is born of an intimate understanding of 
the extent of government’s failure in Nigeria and the day-to-day, decade-to-decade experience of 
overwhelming structural impediments to the government’s ability to reform itself. It is in this 
spirit that Obi Akwani (2002) argues that movies such as the Issakaba series can be viewed as 
popular rejoinders to the HRW report. Yet the videos’ depiction of lethal extrajudicial justice and 
the ultimate failure of vigilantes to maintain “clean hands” can also be taken as a confirmation of 
the report's grimmest charges. While some Nigerians still feel that their life is safer than it was 
before the vigilantes began their campaign against criminals, public opinion as reflected in 
editorials and comments reported in the press has become more pessimistic about the 
consequences of vigilantism (Abuja 2002, Ujumadu 2002). 
Nevertheless, critics like Ekeh, Nwana, and Akwani insist that HRW fails to understand that 
many Nigerians feel that reform must begin at the grassroots level. The Bakassi Boy’s vigilante 
movement was an armed uprising, not against the government, but against the absence of 
effective government. While the failure of the Bakassi Boys is now evident, the movies still 
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capture a profound longing for social transformation at a community level. In the movies, heroes 
step forth from their ordinary lives and take political reform into their own hands. This reform 
operates through highly localized insurrections—a village-by-village overthrow of corruption—
implying that only a nation of communities that have exorcised their own demons and 
established trustworthy leadership can hope for effective reform at the highest levels. For 
Nigerians, this understanding of Nigeria’s predicament, while setting the requirements for reform 
quite high, has a certain practical plausibility that HRW’s universal human rights prescriptions 
lack. It is a charter for a higher national destiny that must first be seized by people in their own 
communities rather than imposed from above by government or externally by international law. 
The vigilante movies capture a shared vision of what Nigerians wish vigilantes could be and, in 
the case of Issakaba, also gesture at what they unfortunately appear to have become. While the 
cinematic version is romanticized and fanciful, from a Nigerian perspective it may be no more so 
than HRW’s expectation that Nigeria’s government can readily reform itself. Even a national 
leadership with the best intentions would find itself up against an entrenched configuration of 
illegitimate relationships with powerful multinational corporations, particularly the oil industry, 
that have proven highly resistant to calls for reform and restructuring. True political reform in 
Nigeria would require, at the very least, the multinational petroleum corporations taking 
responsibility for the role they play in distorting Nigeria’s economy, maintaining kleptocratic 
structures of administration, and yielding profit from corrupt arrangements of commerce.viii  It 
appears, however, that Nigeria’s citizens are less than confident that such a development is likely 
in the near future and so they focus their attention on their own communities. This political 
realism is bluntly reduced to the slogan “fuck the world, save yourself” emblazoned across a t-
shirt worn by Ebube in the second Issakaba movie. Ultimately most Nigerians would probably 
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agree that vigilantism is not sustainable as a system of justice. When viewed from the ground, 
however, cleaning up their own communities seems a more plausible goal than reforming the 
most powerful industry in the world and reclaiming their wayward government. A true empathy 
for the despair that confronts the Nigerian desire for justice helps account for the popular 
attraction to the cinematic mythos of the reforming hero—the promise of hope evoked by 





It is important to note that while this article was in review for ASR, a movement to reform 
Nigeria’s government at the highest levels gained momentum and international visibility. Efforts 
to take local control of law enforcement have spawned a monstrous and unaccountable array of 
arbitrary powers—from vigilantes in the southeast to Sharia law in the north. Spurred by the 
federal government’s ineffectiveness in the face of increasing political turmoil and recent tragic 
incidents of inter-ethnic violence, a proposal for a Sovereign National Conference to 
reformulate the political structure and constitution of Nigeria is finding support among a wide 
range of ethnic, regional, and religious leaders. In a recent forum, conference advocates argued 
that Nigeria’s highest goal must be to restore the people’s faith “in the possibility that they can 
change their governments through the ballot box” (Ibe 2004).  
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Notes 
 
i Jonathan Haynes (2000) edited volume Nigerian Video Films provides an excellent overview of 
Nigeria’s video movie industry. 
ii Issakaba is Bakassi spelled backwards with a final vowel added to make it more easily pronounceable. 
iii Talbot (1932: 331) wrote: “A small grey bird is also used as a war preparation. They cut the warrior and 
rub in the preparation; they also put some into a belt that he wears round his waist. Afterwards no bullet 
can harm him. We call this medicine Abigwe.” Harnischfeger (2003: 46-47) provides a more current 
account of protective jujus used by modern Yoruba OPC militiamen: “They take a clay pot of water with 
them which is carried by a virgin or an elderly women… [who] puts the pot down, strips herself naked 
and washes her private parts therein. Thereafter, amid weird chants, all the eshos take turns to scoop water 
from the pot which they use in washing their faces.” In the first Issakaba movie armed robbers are seen 
drinking a concoction provided by a powerful native doctor in order to be “fortified” against machetes. In 
Issakaba 3 a rather distinct formula for the Issakaba’s protection juju is offered. The strength and 
invincibility of Issakaba is made potent by the spirit of a brave and ancient warrior by the name of Oja 
Dike. In those days, Oja Dike was a fearless warrior who fought against evil. He was so powerful that no 
arrow or sword could pierce his body. One day, Oja Dike out of ignorance, slay an innocent girl, soiling 
his hands with innocent blood. Oja Dike became powerless and committed suicide. The strength of 
Issakaba is beyond the physical. They are so powerful because the spirit of Oja Dike guides them. That is 
why no bullet can pierce their body. 
iv This Igbo orthography follows that prescribed by Echeruo (1998). 
v Frank Hives (1930) published a self-aggrandizing account of the colonial confrontation with Igbo arünsi 
in southeastern Nigeria under the title Ju-ju and Justice in Nigeria. 
vi Thanks to Achebe’s (1959) use of Yeats’ verse: “Things fall apart; the center cannot hold,” to frame his 
story of the disruption colonial modernism brought to an Igbo community, the phrase has taken on 
proverbial status and now commonly flows from the lips of Igbo-land’s eloquent and well-read elders. 
vii Section 214 of the current version of the Nigerian constitution, instituted in 1999, specifically forbids 
state and local police forces. 
viii A recent tax evasion charge against Dallas based oilfield services firm Halliburton Inc. revealed that 
they paid bribes totaling $2.4 million to Nigerian tax officials (Igbikiowubo 2003). Halliburton has been 
suspect in the view of many Nigerians since 1998 when villagers in the oil rich Niger Delta accused the 
company of complicity in the shooting, by Nigeria’s Mobile Police Unit, of a protester who was 
organizing resistance to the company’s exploitive operations. As in similar cases involving Shell and 
Chevron, Halliburton claimed they employ the notorious “kill-and-go” unit to protect company properties 
(Leopold 2003). 
